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Summary 
Standardization plays a key role in modern industries. Standards provide 
compatibility and interoperability of products, thus increasing their value for 
consumers. In fact, standards go beyond that and positively affect market 
integration, consumer safety, environment issues etc.  The European Union 
actively supports standardization run by Standard Setting Organizations. 
These organizations operate on voluntarily participation. However, benefits 
generated by standards to businesses, attract companies to take part in the 
adoption of such standards. Standards, especially in ICT market, are usually 
sophisticated and consisting of hundreds or thousands technologies subject to 
Intellectual Property rights of different companies. Once technology is 
included into a standard and covers key functionalities for the standard to 
work effectively, patent covering the technology gains status of Standard-
essential patent. This means, standard implementers cannot design around it, 
and must get access from the proprietor of such patent. Owners of such 
patents receive plenty of benefits from their technology inclusion into a 
standard and in exchange are required, by SSO, to commit to license their 
SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND). However, 
Intellectual Property law grants exclusionary rights to patent owners to seek 
for patent injunctions against alleged infringers. Assessing these rights 
without limitations would endanger competition and the efficiency of 
standard-setting process. Therefore, competition law is entitled to provide 
restrictions on the freedom of SEP owners right to seek for patent injunctions. 
In 2015, the European Court of Justice delivered a long awaited ruling in the 
case Huawei v ZTE. The Court aimed to strike a balance between maintaining 
free competition, under Article 102 TFEU, and the requirements to safeguard 
SEP proprietor’s rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. The ruling led to many discussions, whether the 
requirements provided in Huawei are sufficient to prevent SEP owners from 
premature seeking of injunctions. 
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SEP Standard Essential Patent 
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Treaty on the Functioning of 
European Union 
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Intellectual Property Rights 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
One of the central objectives for the creation of European Union was the 
establishment of Internal Market.1 The Internal Market relies on four 
economic freedoms- free movement of persons, goods, capital and services.2 
Another fundamental for success of Internal Market is the highly competitive 
environment, protected by EU Competition Law.3 Competition law 
safeguards Internal Market, businesses and consumers from harmful effects 
that may be result of anticompetitive behaviour. Cartels, monopolies and 
dominant firms hold greatest power to produce such effects, thus deserved 
special attention from competition authorities.4 Nevertheless, the European 
Union also seeks to ensure continuous technological progress through 
promoting innovation. But ‘innovation is costly and risky business’ requiring 
large investments which may not generate any profits.5 The importance to 
promote inventors’ incentives to innovate was recognised at the global level 
under TRIPS agreement6, which offers a wide range of Intellectual Property 
rights and delineates the minimum standards for states to ensure IP protection. 
In modern industries such as ICT, IPRs play a key role for successful 
competition of businesses. Firms, that are first to place technology on the 
market and limit third party’s ability to use their inventions, gain opportunity 
to extract large profits. Therefore, it was long thought that patents confer 
monopoly to their owners.7 Additionally, Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights were viewed to be at the opposite sides of the barricade. 
However, the widespread approach now is that in fact these two laws share 
the common objectives and complement each other towards dynamic highly 
competitive market, defined by intense innovation. On the other hand, 
disputes of interplay between Intellectual Property and Competition arise 
again in the context of standardisation. The standard-setting generated 
obvious benefits to number of aspects in the economy, innovation, consumer 
welfare, safety, environment etc. This led competition authorities to bypass 
standardization fearing that intervention may lead to negative effects on 
innovation. Also, Standard-Setting Organizations were considered to do a 
good job towards the common market and public goals. However, the 
increased number of players in modern industries created incentives for 
companies to shield themselves from competition with the help of IPRs in 
                                                 
1 Article 3 TEU. 
2 Article 26 (2) TFEU. 
3 Articles 101-109 TFEU. 
4 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford 
University Press. Fifth edition, 2014. Pg. 3. 
5 N. Petit, S. Bostyn Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction (December 31, 2013). Pg. 1. 
6 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
 
7 See N. Petit, S. Bostyn n 5. 
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standard-setting process. Competition authorities addressed the dangers of 
deceptive behaviour in standard-setting and encouraged SSOs to include the 
requirements of ex ante IPR disclosure and FRAND commitments into their 
policies. Nevertheless, companies, in ICT market, are now battling each other 
through premature patent injunctions, thus putting effective implementation 
of standards and public interest at risk.8 Competition law is called upon again 
to curb the selfish actions of firms. Standardization, however, generates many 
complex questions that are subject for discussions in many fields: IPRs, 
Competition Law, engineering, economics, finances and functioning of patent 
systems. Therefore, some issues flowing from standard-setting are not for 
competition law to solve. This paper will discuss the recent developments in 
antitrust treatment of standard-essential patents and FRAND licensing. In 
2015, the European Court of Justice delivered a long awaited ruling in 
Huawei case laying down the principles governing abuse of dominant 
position under the Article 102 TFEU by patent injunction seekers. Huawei is 
considered to be the first precedent on this matter and was hoped to harmonise 
different approaches taken by national courts and the EU Commission. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
As the title indicates, the thesis aims to address the degree of current interplay 
of Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and standard-setting. 
However, as if the matter was not sophisticated enough, many aspects, in 
particular those concerning standard-setting deserved a closer look on their 
own. Therefore, paper first aims to provide simplified explanations of the 
origins and rationale behind standard-setting, SSOs, SEPs and FRAND to lay 
basis for further understanding of complex legal issues. Another aim is to 
introduce the reader to a variety of legal theories and proposals from scholars 
towards solving the problem. This thesis will try to answer the following 
questions: 
- Is SEP owner, who previously committed to FRAND licensing, 
entitled to seek injunctions against alleged infringer? 
- Should FRAND concept be more specified? 
- What are implications of requirements set in Huawei? 
1.3 Method and materials 
The descriptive method is used to untie the net of complex aspects 
surrounding standard-setting activities of SSOs particularly in the ICT 
market. Paired with historical overview, it will help to bring the reader into 
reality of standardization and understand its importance in technology driven 
industries. It is important to notice, that historical overviews were usually 
provided relying on single sources from competent authors: 
 
                                                 
8 Also known as ‘patent wars’. 
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1.  History of Standardisation (see subchapter 2.2) - Wang Ping: A Brief 
History of Standards and Standardization Organizations: A Chinese 
Perspective. East-West Center Working Papers (2011). 
2.  Origins of FRAND (see page 17.)-  Jorge L. Contreras. A Brief History of 
FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust 
Through a Historical Lens (January 15, 2015); American University, WCL 
Research Paper No. 2014-18. 
 
Because of short theory and jurisprudence, the discussion will rely on plenty 
of academic articles, representing different approaches. Most of them address 
SEPs, FRAND and injunctions from antitrust perspective. Rich in arguments, 
they may provide support or criticism for current approach taken by 
competition authorities as well as guide the way for future developments. 
Analysis of the Huawei and other relevant case-law, from the CJEU and the 
Commission, is provided using traditional legal dogmatic method. Finally, 
thesis will rely on Communications from the Commission in order to outline 
the newest trends of EU’s policy in the field of innovation, standardization 
and ICT. 
 
1.4  Limitations 
Activities of standard setting organisations are at the core of European 
Union’s policy towards accelerating innovation. This thesis, therefore, will 
focus on formal standards approved by standard-setting organisations. 
Nevertheless, some examples given of popular standards and case analysis on 
Microsoft and Orange-Book-Standard concern de facto standards. It is not the 
aim of the analysis to provide the answer of antitrust treatment to the aspects 
regarding de facto standards. Second, Intellectual Property law offers a wide 
range of rights, but whenever term ‘IPRs’ is used, it will mostly concern 
patents, however, some cases mentioned regard copyrights, but they are 
discussed in as much as author saw it relevant to the main topic. Also, only 
those patents that are essential to implementation of the standard and are 
FRAND-pledged lie at the centre of discussion. However, general topics, for 
example, ‘Standard and the ICT market’ may cover all kinds of patents. 
Finally, the discussion rarely steps out of the European Union, however some 
suggestions, included in the thesis, are provided by American authors, relying 
on their home situation of FRAND licensing. Thus they are discussed to 
supplement the variety of possible solutions. 
 
1.5 Outline 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The Chapter 1- Introduction- provides a 
guide to background and purpose of this work, also determines the methods 
and materials used for the research. The Chapter 2 will introduce to the 
historical circumstances of standardization and its importance for the ICT 
market and European Union. It also discusses the interplay between 
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competition law and Intellectual Property in the context of standard-setting. 
The Chapter ends with overview of FRAND controversy and approaches 
taken by scholars how to improve licensing of standard-essential patents. The 
Chapter 3 will present the proceedings of Huawei case before the European 
Court of Justice. For the better understanding on the developments brought 
by Huawei the same Chapter will discuss the preceding case-law on the 
relevant points and the in depth analysis of the Huawei judgment will be 
provided in the Chapter 4. Finally, the Chapter 5 will address the author’s 
conclusion of this thesis. 
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2. Standardization 
2.1 Introduction 
Today, standardization is acknowledged to be an indispensable element for 
the free international trade and the growth of global economy. It affects 
almost everyone, from companies and governments to the public and 
consumers. Standardization played a significant role in the creation of the EU 
Single Market. According to the Commission Guidelines, standards 
encourage the development of new and improved products, ‘thus normally 
increase competition and lower output and sales costs, benefiting economies 
as a whole.’9 Companies, that conform with standards, reduce their costs and 
increase productive and innovative efficiencies thus gaining a better market 
position and access to new markets.10 Standardised products are usually safer, 
easier to use, and provide better quality, thus they lead to better relations with 
suppliers and clients.11 For example, something as simple as an A4 sheet 
paper relies on a standard, whereas high-tech devices (phones, laptops, 
computers) contain hundreds of them. Standards, therefore, are all around us. 
In 2009, The Commission has requested major mobile phone producers to 
harmonise mobile chargers in the EU, that complies with Micro-USB 
connector. Additionally, new EU standards will ensure continued safe charger 
use.12 Consumers will no longer need to buy a new charger of the same brand 
as the new phone, which is expected to cut down 51 000 tons of electronic 
waste annually.13 Standards, therefore, bring convenience and freedom for the 
users to mix and match their items less expensively and reduce unnecessary 
variety to the benefit of environment. 
 
Generally, standards can be understood as bases and rules for measuring in 
various human activities.14 This definition includes both formal and informal 
standards (e.g. moral norms). This paper mainly focuses on legal relationships 
between companies in the context of standardization, therefore will rely on a  
narrower definition provided by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). Formally, standard is defined as ‘a document, 
established by consensus and approved by a recognised body, that provides 
                                                 
9 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation 
agreements, 2011/C 11/01, point 263. 
10 Communication from the Commission COM/2011/0311 final. A strategic vision for 
European standards: Moving forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the 
European economy by 2020. Para. 5. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Commission welcomes industry’s commitment to provide a common charger for mobile 
phones, Brussels, 29-06-2009. 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/electrical-engineering/rtte-directive/common-
charger/index_en.htm 
 
14 This definition suggested by Wang Ping in: A Brief History of Standards and 
Standardization Organizations: A Chinese Perspective. East-West Center Working Papers, 
No. 117, April 2011 
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for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities 
or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in 
a given context’.15 Consequently, standardization is the activity of 
establishing such documents.  For the better understanding of the 
standardization’s role and impact on the economic development, it is 
important to outline the historical circumstances that gave rise to standards as 
solution to market issues. 
 
2.2. History of standardization 
 
While the first examples of a standard could go as early as the creation of a 
calendar, standardization, as we understand it nowadays, started with the 
Industrial Revolution in the clash of 18th and 19th centuries. Transitioning 
from hand method to machines gave birth to mass production and cheap 
labour, therefore increased the need for high precision and simple use tools, 
as most of the workers were new to the machinery. In addition, companies 
were seeking to maximise the capacity of production, profit and quality, 
which was the driving force for early attempts of in-company 
standardization.16 Applying standards within company, allowed employee 
labour division and specialization working in assembly-line. Standardised 
mass production increased the efficiency of companies and market, quality of 
the products, social and industrial development. Innovation was considered 
to be the key element of firm’s successful performance and competition on 
the market. In-company standards served a great basis for R&D and technical 
modernization. Series of most valuable inventions emerged during Industrial 
Revolution. Special attention to innovation resulted in products so complex 
that manufacture and design of a whole product within a single company was 
too burdensome. Firms started to divide and specialize in producing spare 
parts, creating a long chain of manufacturers needed to assemble the final 
product. However, this led to unnecessary diversity and incompatibility 
among products as engineers across companies had a different idea on the 
measurements of each part. The lack of cooperation in trade relations and 
technical solutions among companies led to increased waste of resources and 
negative effects on the whole industry. It was realised that competitive market 
alone was no longer able to fix the economic issues and that companies in fact 
are dependent on each other and share common interest for larger profits.17 
First standard-setting organizations (SSOs) were created in England in 19th 
century. A group of specialists, which usually consisted of representatives of 
firms, government, society and relevant field experts, would decide on a 
technical standard that companies voluntarily agreed to conform with. This 
allowed to achieve continuous and uniform manufacturing throughout market 
stream, which was highly beneficial for public interest and the order of the 
                                                 
15The Consumer and Standards: Guidance and principles for consumer participation in 
standards development (ISO/IEC), March 2003, pg. 5 
16 See Wang Ping n 14, p. 4-7. 
17 Ibid, 8-12. 
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market.18 SSOs were acting on the principles of transparency, openness and 
consensus.19 The positive impact on the market performance brought by 
standards deserved the interest to create national SSOs for a more uniform 
and harmonised standardization.  In the 20th century developed European 
countries and United States founded their national SSOs. After the end of 
World War II, there was a rapid rise of globalization and international trade. 
However, differences between the standards across countries created 
obstacles for free trade, which triggered the creation of international and 
regional SSOs.  
 
Modern SSOs are non-profit organizations or associations that do not possess 
any legal authority and their activities on standardization rely on voluntary 
participation. Standards are usually adopted by voting and participants are 
free to decide whether to conform with standards. Standards that no or very 
few companies comply with are not effective whether they are standards at 
all. In order to ensure the legitimacy of its decisions and uniform application 
of standards, SSOs try to include many different stakeholders and encourage 
their consensus, with the help of expert opinion, over developing a standard.20 
Consensus and development of trustful relationships among participants lead 
to the success of the standards. However, public authorities may enforce 
mandatory standards for health, safety or, as in the previous example of 
common charger, environmental reasons. It is, therefore, important to 
maintain variety of participants in standardization, so the standard conforms 
with not only the best technical solutions but also represents the interests of 
society, businesses and market integration.21 
 
 
2.3 Standardization in European Union  
European Union pays special attention to standards. The integration of 
Internal Market depended heavily upon standardization which helped against 
trade barriers caused by differences of materials and products across Member 
States as the excuse for their protectionist policies.22 Standards in EU are used 
as policy instruments for the proper functioning of Single Market, 
interoperability of networks and systems, environmental and consumer 
protection, social development and innovation. EU Commission closely 
cooperates with European Standardization Organisations (ESOs) and 
encourages higher cooperation between ESOs and International SSOs. CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI are three officially recognized organizations to have 
competence over adoption of European Standards (EU and beyond) and at the 
                                                 
18 Ibid p. 8-9. 
19 Ibid, pg. 11. 
20 N. Brunsson, A. Rasche, D. Seidl: The Dynamics of Standardization: Three Perspectives 
on Standards in Organization Studies. Organization Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5-6, pp. 613-632. 
21 See COM/2011/0311 final n 10 ‘An inclusive standards development process’. 
22 Ibid.  European standardization system contributed significantly mainly in relation to free 
movement of goods. 
 11 
request of Commission, so called harmonised standards (EU).23 The 
Commission, nevertheless, expresses concerns that European Union is not 
doing good enough in terms of innovation and investments and falls behind 
the U.S and Japan. Modern European competitiveness depends on the ability 
to foster innovation in products. Europe is a home to many great inventions 
and researchers, however, under-investment in a knowledge foundation, poor 
access to finance, costly IPRs and slow standardisation directs companies to 
invest and conduct research in many other parts of the world. Innovation, 
therefore, has been placed at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy.24 
Affordable IPRs and faster setting of interoperable standards are among the 
core tasks that EU should achieve in order to maintain its competitiveness.25 
 
2.3.1   Standards and the ICT market  
The impact and necessity of standards varies across markets. Modern 
industries demand higher density of standards as opposed to traditional ones. 
This paper provides discussion on standards in relation to Information and 
Communication Technologies market (ICT)26, whereas ICT standards stand 
out for their complexity and additional interoperability feature, which, in 
perfect world, is the ability of a product and system to work together with 
other products and systems, regardless the manufacturer, operator and other 
technical details. However, high number of companies, sophisticated 
products and intense innovation leads to fragmentation of ICT market and 
creates barriers for higher interoperability among products and systems. 
Interoperable standards, therefore, are necessary to serve as bridges between 
technologies and products to interact within single network, providing 
freedom of choice for consumers as well as the platform for new technical 
developments. The European Union bodies stress out the key role of 
standardization to the further development of Single Market, and seeks to 
promote and harmonize standard-setting process in ESOs, through 
additionally financing their activities, also increase their cooperation with 
international SSOs and those in Member States. Regulation 1025/2012 on 
European Standardisation seeks to provide a framework for a more 
transparent, efficient and effective European standardization. The Regulation 
stresses out the importance of standards to wide range of economic and social 
aspects:27  
 
                                                 
23 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
European standardization, 25 October, 2012, para. (4). 
24 COM(2010) 546 final. Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative (‘Innovation Union’). Brussels, 
6.10.2010. Pg. 2. 
25 Ibid, Pg. 3. Point 7. 
26 Term ICT is chosen for its ability to cover everything that collects, stores, process, receives 
and transmits information including communication networks and systems. Additionally, 
Communications from the European Commission favor the use of ICT. Some authors 
however use terms such as technology-enabled markets (N. Petit) and New Economy (A. 
Jones). 
27 See Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 on European standardization, pt. (3), (22), 
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‘<…> Standards produce significant positive economic effects, for example by 
promoting economic interpenetration on the internal market and encouraging the 
development of new and improved products or markets and improved supply 
conditions <…> Standards may maintain and enhance quality, provide information 
and ensure interoperability and compatibility, thereby increasing safety and value 
for consumers. Standards can have a broad impact on society, in particular on the 
safety and well-being of citizens, the efficiency of networks, the environment, 
workers’ safety and working conditions, accessibility and other public policy fields.’ 
 
Effective standardization and intense innovation laid the foundations for 
Internet of Things market (IoT). To keep at pace with world economy’s 
transformation to digital economy, European Commission issued a strategy 
on creation of Single Digital Market:28 
 
The goal is to ensure that ICT-related standards are set in a way that is more responsive to 
policy needs, agile, open, more strongly linked to research and innovation, better joined-up, 
and thus that they ultimately have more impact for the wider European economy as it 
transforms into a digital one.29 
 
The key point of IoT, is to create connection between ICT and non-ICT 
sectors. To be precise, IoT aims to accommodate digital systems (sensors, 
hardware, software, network connections) to the physical objects (houses, 
cars, bridges, heart monitors etc.) across all industries, modern or 
traditional.30 Standards will enable all ‘smart’ objects to connect and 
communicate with each other, share gathered data from virtual or physical 
environment, thus creating digital ecosystem and networked society that is 
able to provide best solutions for science, industries and our daily lives.31 In 
the light of digital shift, European Commission  stresses the need for fast, 
predictable, efficient and globally acceptable IPR licencing approach.32 
Various debates are taking place around standard-setting, IPRs and 
competition policy. For now, it is clear that current licensing principles do not 
satisfy the needs of modern economies. It is helpful to take a look at the 
specifics of ICT sector, which provides basis for further discussion on 
complex legal and economic issues generated by standard-setting. 
Characteristics inherent to ICT: 
1. Intense innovation and density of IPRs. Firm’s success in ICT market 
is highly determined by the magnitude of efforts and investments it 
contributes to Research and Development (R&D). Successful R&D 
results in inventions over which company acquires IPRs.33 Ownership 
                                                 
28 Communication from Commission: ICT Standardization Priorities for the Digital Single 
Market. Brussels, 19.4.2016. COM (2016) 176. 
29 Communication from Commission on Digital Single Market, pg. 2. 
30 Ibid, pg. 3. 
31 One of IoT goals is to reduce human to machine interaction and promote machine to 
machine interaction (M2M). See for example 
http://www.ericsson.com/res/docs/2013/networked-society-essentials-booklet.pdf 
 
32 Communication from Commission on Digital Single Market, pg. 13. 
33 M. Rato and N. Petit. Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established 
Standards Reconsidered? (January 29, 2014). European Competition Journal, April 2013.  
Pg. 3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2387357 
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of IPRs allow companies to perform better in ICT market and generate 
higher revenues than the ones that do not hold IPRs.34  
2. Short product life-cycles. Due to rapid innovation across whole sector, 
ICT products after launch soon come out of date, and need 
improvements and updates to keep at pace with newly developed 
technologies from competitors.35 
3. Standard-setting activities play a crucial role in ICT market.36 For 
example, company manufactures graphic cards for the computers, in 
order for the product to be successful, company needs to make sure 
that graphic card works together with the rest of hardware as well as 
software, made by other companies. Consequently, firms that 
specialize in making other hardware parts and software want their 
products to comply with the all produced graphic cards.  The higher 
degree of interoperability product carries, the higher value it has for 
consumers. Furthermore, companies that manufacture multifunctional 
products such as smartphones face greater challenges to satisfy 
interoperability demands. The product needs to interoperate with 
higher number of elements like networks and systems, phone 
operators, various services, applications and phones of other brands. 
Standard-setting is an effective tool to bring all industry players for 
cooperation in producing highest quality products and reduce market 
fragmentation.  
 
Standards usually refer to technologies covered by patents. To comply with 
an ICT standard, company must get access to a number of patented 
technologies that are owned by different firms and are essential to the 
implementation of that standard. Patents that protect such technologies are 
called Standard-essential patents (SEPs). Companies cannot design around 
SEPs, but only participate in adoption of alternative standards. While 
standardization and SSOs still runs on voluntary participation, some standards 
like USB are so widely spread that non-compliance with them and attempt to 
adopt alternative standard would result in serious economic issues for the 
one’s business. ICT market heavily relies on innovation and IPR’s, new 
inventions come into light each day, therefore SSOs must react quick to better 
developments and adopt new standards, making improved products available 
for public use. The interoperability goals, dynamic innovation and high 
concentration of IPRs raises tensions between competitors in the ICT market. 
Firms must get licenses from number of SEP proprietors per standard and 
invest in modification of their products or processes according to that 
standard. The need of multiple licenses from different patent holders would 
drag the company into never ending negotiations over licensing terms and 
royalty stacking, therefore traditional licensing practices became too 
cumbersome for satisfying the needs of modern industries. In order to avoid 
wasting efforts on legal issues and be able to focus on business matters, firms 
                                                 
34 Stefano Comino and Fabio Maria Manenti. Intellectual Property and Innovation in 
Information Communication Technology (ICT). Editor: Nikolaus Thumm. JRC-IPTS report, 
2015. Pg. 2. 
35 See M. Rato, N. Petit n 33 pg. 4. 
36 Ibid, pg. 5. 
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enter cross-license agreements and technology pools that provide one-stop 
licensing. These agreements allow a cost and time effective way for 
technology sharing and helps to avoid royalty stacking and patent disputes in 
the future.37 On the other hand, inclusion of patented technology into a 
standard awards its owner with increased market power which can be 
exploited in anticompetitive manner through the exercise of IPRs. 
 
 
2.3.2 Intellectual Property and anti-competitive behaviour 
 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law should not be seen as conflicting 
laws. They both share the same objectives: promotion of consumer welfare 
and innovation. Essentially, IP law seeks to protect IP owners’ rights to their 
inventions from unlawful copying by less successful innovators. In ICT 
market IPR’s are dominant and strategically important for companies. Due to 
the nature of high tech products, patents are the most prevailing form of IP. 
The development of new technologies is usually very costly and risky while 
the process of reverse engineering is not. Patents offer the inventor 
exclusionary rights to be the first seller of a new product and prevent others 
from free-riding. This time-limited opportunity to extract the profit by 
exploiting IP rights, whether through marketing or licensing, is the driving 
force for companies’ incentives to innovate.38 It is not difficult to see the 
potential of patent rights as strategic move to increase market power and 
eliminate competitors ultimately creating monopoly. Therefore, IPR’s are not 
immune from the intervention of competition law, which provides 
mechanisms to prevent the anti-competitive behaviour. As will be seen below, 
exercise of IPR’s in the context of standardization, are subject to even stricter 
limitations. 
 
Usually, standardization takes place in the form of agreements between 
companies. These are called standardization agreements, and when they are 
concluded between competitors, are subject to article 101 TFEU.39 
Standardization agreements ‘have as their primary object the definition of 
technical or quality requirements with which current or future products, 
production services or methods may comply’.40 Generally, the Commission 
views standardization agreements as having significant positive effects on 
integration of the market, competition on the merits and product value for 
consumers.41 However, the Commission stresses out, that meetings in the 
context of standard-setting, provide forum for competitors to collective 
decision-making and, like all meetings between competitors, raises risks of 
                                                 
37 H.H Lidgard and J. Atik: Licensing in an International Context. Cases on US and EU Law 
and Practices (2015, Lund University), pg. 393-395. 
38 See N. Petit, S. Bostyn. Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction n 7 pg. 5-6. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373471 
 
39 See Horizontal Guidelines n 9, point 5. 
40 Ibid, point 257. 
41 Ibid, point 263. 
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collusive outcome on the market.42 Furthermore, these agreements conclude 
that one technology is chosen over the others, which eliminates competition 
between current and future technologies. Companies that manufacture 
competing technologies may face barriers to entry and be excluded from the 
market.43 Therefore, the Commission addresses the importance of 
unrestricted and transparent participation in standard-setting.44 In addition, 
Carl Shapiro suggests, that in the absence of cooperation, firms would 
compete for the market, thus may ‘incur initial losses as the attempt to 
become dominant network.’ Cooperation allows implementers of the standard 
to compete within the market rather focusing to attract buyers with other 
qualities such as product price, features and post-sales services.45 Standards, 
thus, create a uniform network of products that comply and/or interoperate 
with each other and strengthen competition by enabling consumers to easily 
switch between the products of different firms.46 Moreover, standard 
implementers enhance inventive performance through financing further 
innovation instead of overlapping R&D. Antitrust authorities will carefully 
examine standardization agreements whether their generated efficiencies 
outweigh restrictive effects on competition. Nevertheless, not only 
standardisation agreements but also the behaviour of companies in the 
standard-setting activities deserved special attention from competition 
agencies, whether prior or post the adoption of standard.47 
 
Patent hold-up 
 
Usually, companies seek for their own technology to be incorporated into 
standard, approved by SSOs, for number of reasons. First, companies acquire 
the collection of royalties from licencing their SEPs to standard 
implementers. Second, the base of potential licensees of SEPs is much higher 
than the one before the technology was included into a standard.48 This 
compensates the investments in previous and future R&D. Firms need less 
modification of their products to comply with standards which is also cost 
saving. Reduced costs and holding SEPs increase company’s market power 
and the dependency of other companies on SEPs holders’ will and terms to 
license. Benefits generated by holding SEPs, lure firms to act in anti-
competitive ways. This naturally raises concerns from EU Competition law 
                                                 
42 Case COMP/38.636 Rambus, 9 December 2009 (Commitment’s Decision), para. (30). 
43 See Horizontal Guidelines n 9, points 264-266. 
44 Ibid, point 280. 
45 Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion? In Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 91–93 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). Pg. 89. 
According to author, cooperative standard-setting decreases competition at some dimensions 
in a near term, while increases competitive environment in other dimensions in the future. 
46 Case AT.39939-Samsung-Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, 29.04.2014. 
Recital (22). 
 
47 Alison Jones. Standard-Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the 
Smartphone Wars. February 12, 2014. (2014) 10(1) European Competition Journal 1-36; 
King's College London Law School Research Paper 2014-19. Pg. 4. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394495 
 
48 See Case AT.39939-Samsung. Recital (25). 
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perspective. For example, before the standard is agreed and approved by SSO, 
company may conceal the fact that it holds patents, or pending applications 
for the patents, essential to that standard. After the standard is adopted, SEP 
proprietor starts claiming royalties for the use of its patents. This so called 
‘patent ambush’ was addressed in the case Rambus v. FTC.49 Standard-setting 
does not only focus around best technical solutions but also represents 
interests of businesses and consumer welfare. Where competing technologies 
provide similar technical quality, SSO is likely to choose patent-free 
technology over proprietary ones, in order to avoid royalty fees, which later 
are passed on to downstream consumers. The secrecy of holding SEPs allows 
company to capture a standard and charge higher royalties, which, absent 
deceptive conduct, it would not have been able to charge.50 Such conduct is 
also known as patent hold-up, which arises ‘when a gap between economic 
commitments and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to 
capture part of the fruits of another’s investment’.51 Prior to the agreement on 
standard, companies are free to test and abandon undesirable technologies, 
whether ex post standard-setting, parties likely already made significant 
investments into compliance with new standard. This situation de facto locks 
the industry into both standard and relevant SEPs.52 Companies fearing to 
incur losses will be forced to accept less favourable licensing terms and 
conditions, such as royalty rates. Therefore, the value of SEPs, ex post 
inclusion into standard, greatly exceeds its value ex ante. The issue is greater 
in ICT industry where interoperable standards, include large number of SEPs, 
each of them reading only on a small component of a larger end product. 
Standard implementers may produce goods being unaware that they are in 
breach of someone’s SEPs.53 Such conduct, under IP law, enables patent 
holders to seek for injunctions before courts. Enforcing injunctions against 
SEP implementers would sabotage the success of standard’s interoperability 
and harm competitor’s business, even in situations where he wasn’t acting in 
bad faith.54 Furthermore, injunctions of SEPs after industry lock-in reward 
their owners disproportionately to their inventive contribution. The fear of 
possible hold-up after standardization may discourage standard implementers 
                                                 
49 Rambus Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 22 April 2008, 522 F.3d 456, (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
FTC concluded that due to Rambus’s ‘deceptive course of conduct’ JEDEC(SSO) included 
its patents into a standard, which it wouldn’t have done in the case of complete disclosure. 
Or, such conduct was aimed to avoid RAND assurances with possible ex ante licensing 
negotiations. 
50 See COMP/38.636 Rambus, n 42, para. (28), (40). 
51 Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, Theresa Sullivan: Standard Setting, Patents, and 
Hold-Up. 74 Antitrust Law Journal No. 3 (2007), pg. 603. 
52 Competition Policy Brief. Occasional discussion papers by the Competition Directorate-
General of the European Commission. Issue 8, June 2014. Pg. 3. 
53 Thomas F. Cotter. Patent Hold-up, Patent Remedies and Antitrust Responses: The Role of 
Patent Remedies and Antitrust Law in Dealing with ‘Patent Holdups.’ March 10, 2009. Pg. 
1-2. 
54 Carl Shapiro. Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting (March 2001). Author addresses the problem of the patent flood caused by patent 
issue agencies which leads to patent thicket. ‘Companies like IBM, Intel, or Motorola find it 
all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially 
exposing themselves to billions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to 
cease production of key products’. 
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to invest in standard enabled market ex ante.55 Another issue, generated by 
standards in ICT market, is the potential of royalty stacking. ICT standards 
consist of many complementary technologies, owned by different patent 
holders. Standard implementer gains no value from license agreement of one 
or few SEPs if he does not have access to the rest of SEPs. Multiple SEP 
owners set their desired royalties independently and thus royalties stack to a 
rate that is much higher than the amount of royalties if single SEP owner 
would licence whole package of SEPs.56 Even holders of SEPs that cover 
minor components of the standard, gain power to ex post overcharge of 
royalties through the threat of seeking injunctions. In the end, consumers face 
high prices which reduces sales for downstream firms and efficiency of a 
standard.57 
 
It was observed that power, resulting from SEPs inclusion into a standard, 
should not be exploited through refusal to license, imposition of predatory 
terms and patent injunctions on willing licensees. 58 To restrict the probability 
of ex post anti-competitive behaviour, mainly in relation to hold-up, SSOs, at 
the request of competition bodies, tightened their IPR policies by requiring 
their members to disclose any relevant SEPs and commit to license those 
SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) or reasonable and 
non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.59 Origins of FRAND can trace as early as 
1940’s, when U.S courts and antitrust agencies recognised abusive licensing 
as anticompetitive and harmful to innovation and consumers.60 In subsequent 
Decades a chain of American cases focused on remedies to curb such 
licensors, mainly imposing requirements of reasonable terms and non-
discrimination against licensees. However, early cases did not regard 
standard-setting. Only in 1960’s, after the government issued decrees in 
antitrust case against AT&T and Western Electric, American Standard 
Association (ASA) revised their policy and permitted technology inclusion 
into a standard only if those patents were promised to be licensed on 
reasonable terms. Further antitrust cases against Dell Computer and Rambus 
triggered the wide adoption of FRAND inclusion within the policies of 
SSOs.61 As opposed to court issued decrees, FRAND commitments are made 
voluntarily by standard participants, nevertheless they share the similar 
interpretation of good licensing principles as those provided by U.S courts in 
the middle of 20th century. 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid, pg. 2. 
56 Philippe Chappatte: FRAND Commitments-the Case for Antitrust Intervention. European 
Competition Journal, August 2009. Pg. 326. 
57 See Alison, Jones n 47 pg. 5. 
58 Philippe Chappatte: FRAND Commitments-the Case for Antitrust Intervention. European 
Competition Journal, August 2009. Pg.319-320. 
59 FRAND and RAND are used as synonyms. See also Alison Jones supra n 18. Pg. 6. 
60 Jorge L. Contreras. A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard 
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens (January 15, 2015). 80 Antitrust Law 
Journal 39 (2015); American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2014-18. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 
 
61 Ibid, pg. 43-44. 
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2.3.3 FRAND 
 
The importance of FRAND commitment is addressed in the Horizontal 
Guidelines together with other principles for procompetitive standard-setting. 
Standardization agreements which risk creating market power, will normally 
fall outside article 101 (1), if they fulfil this criteria: 
 Unrestricted participation in the standard-setting process. 
 Transparent adoption of a standard.  
 No obligation to comply with a standard. 
 Access of standard is ensured on FRAND terms.  
 Good faith disclosure, by SSO members, of all relevant IPRs that may 
be essential to a standard. 
The non-fulfilment of these conditions will not make standardization 
agreement automatically in a breach of article 101(1).  However, then it will 
be examined whether it falls under article 101(1) and if so, whether it can be 
justified under article 101(3).62 These principles do not only safeguard 
competition but also contribute to the efficiency of a standard. Wide 
application of a standard leads to its success to reduce market fragmentation 
and bring more market players to compete, providing larger variety of choice 
for consumers. However, companies fearing hold-ups from SEP owners may 
be discouraged to comply with a standard. ICT standards may, and usually 
do, read on thousands of patents from different proprietors. Each of those 
proprietors, after the standard is agreed, gain market power to control the 
access to standard and charge excessive royalties. Therefore, it is upon SSOs 
to ensure fair process of standard-setting ex ante by requiring of disclosure of 
any relevant IPR’s and licensing on FRAND terms. Generally, under IP law, 
patent holders have the right of refusal to license or are relatively free to 
decide on licensing terms.63 According to N. Petit and S. Bostyn: 
 
‘A patent simply offers market opportunity for the patentee to commercialise 
successfully a product implementing the patented technology. A patent is however 
not any guarantee that the patented technology will gain such massive traction on the 
market…’64 
 
However, in the context of standard-setting, inclusion of SEP into a standard, 
increases the value of that patent, by expanding the market for patented 
technology and eliminating competition from other technologies.65 SEP 
owner bears less risks than normal patent owner, to be precise, standardisation 
provides that guarantee of essential patent’s success through increased 
licensing opportunities, arising from the market lock-in, with third parties that 
                                                 
62 See Horizontal Guidelines supra n 9. Points 277-286. 
63 See Philippe Chappatte n 58. Pg. 327. 
64 See S. Bostyn, N. Petit. Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction n 7. Pg. 2. Authors note that 
while patents may assist in granting market power, such power depends not on a patent as 
right but on the number of other factors, such as time advantage in bringing the product to 
the market, successful marketing, better cost management etc. Pg. 14-15. 
65 See Philippe Chappatte n 58. Pg. 330. 
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already made large investments into standardised products. Therefore, in 
exchange for those benefits, SEP owner is required to provide FRAND 
commitment prior to the adoption of standard as a promise not to exploit its 
newly acquired market power to extract higher royalties, than would be 
normally agreed upon absent the standard. In other words, FRAND 
assurances seek to protect standard implementers while ensuring that SEP 
owners are awarded for their contribution to standards and innovation, but no 
more than the true value of patent ex ante the adoption of standard. However, 
due to its flexibility or rather vagueness, concept of FRAND terms lead to 
great uncertainty and disputes among licensing parties and are far from 
bringing peace to SEP licensing. SSOs provide different guidelines on 
FRAND terms and avoid to deliver clear and explicit indication on its scope. 
The broad definition of FRAND allows to incorporate a large variety of 
market players with different business models into ICT standard-setting.66 
Douglas Lichtman, provides reasons why loosely defined FRAND is more 
attractive for companies participating in the standard-setting than explicit 
price negotiations.67 Primarily, since FRAND commitments take place before 
the adoption of standard, negotiations over validity and value of hundreds of 
patents owned by dozens of companies would take enormous time: 
 
‘One charm of the RAND commitment for participants and the public alike, then, is 
that RAND allows technological implementation to move forward while the parties 
in parallel work out legal and financial details.’ 
  
Second, standardization is a process ‘run by engineers, not lawyers’. It would 
be too expensive for companies, who participate in multiple standard-settings: 
 
‘To send to each of those bodies not only the obviously necessary engineers but also 
an army of lawyers, business executives, and pricing specialists. The RAND 
commitment thus simplifies the conversation, allowing the engineers alone to run 
the show until the technical details are fully selected and documented.’  
 
Sometimes new technologies may look more promising than their true 
commercial value. The time gap between FRAND commitment and actual 
negotiations allow standard implementers to wait for ‘additional information 
before they commit to a specific royalty structure’.68 
 
However, Lichtman agrees, that the concept of today’s FRAND is not good 
enough to solve issues arising from ex post negotiations. Especially, if in legal 
proceedings courts are to value and price patents, which they unlikely do 
better than companies themselves. Shall the court pick too high or too low 
royalty rates, such judgement will not only be imposed on litigating parties 
                                                 
66 Yann Meniere: Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing Terms. 
Research Analysis of a Controversial Concept. JRC science and policy report, 2015. Pg. 4. 
67 Douglas Lichtman. Understanding the RAND Commitment. Houston Law Review, Vol. 
47, p. 1023, 2010; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 100-08. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783406 
 
68 Ibid, pg.1028-1029. 
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but as well will affect other ongoing negotiations over the same SEPs.69 
Licensing parties seeing the possible outcome will always agree on whichever 
royalty rates rather than enter long and pricey litigations. Philippe Chappatte, 
seconds this opinion, providing that national courts in EU may not be 
competent to address what is fair and reasonable, and that FRAND will be 
applied in inconsistent manner throughout Member States.70 
 
Courts and competition authorities previously hesitated to intervene within 
the discretion of SSOs and licensing negotiations between companies.71  
Some argue, that successful work of SSOs, to promote voluntary cooperation 
between stakeholders, attract new entries and enable high degree of 
competition and interoperability between ICT products, well positions SSOs 
to approach better FRAND licensing through revision of IPR policies with 
the consensus of their members. SSOs should take the task to better frame 
FRAND bargaining, as a guidance for courts and stakeholders, without 
favouring one party over the other.72 In contrast, Philippe Chappatte claims 
that FRAND licensing should be addressed by antitrust authorities and 
European Commission is best positioned to deliver clear precedent for the 
national courts and competition authorities to follow.73 Standard-setting, 
which results in hold-up, impairs competition and consumer welfare, and as 
a guardian of the Treaty, European Commission has highest competence to 
prevent such behaviour. Article 101 TFEU provides assessment of those 
standardization agreements that restrict competition by object or effect. 
Finding an infringement under article 101 TFEU brings such agreement being 
void. However, this would cause high losses for all companies involved 
where the market was locked into the standard and large investments being 
made. Enforcement of article 101 TFEU may cause more harm than good on 
those agreements where parties legitimately expected licensing on FRAND 
terms. Therefore, article 102 TFEU shall be enforced in those situations 
where SEP owner exploits its market power, gained from standard-setting, to 
impose excessive royalties on willing licensees that fearing to lose large 
investments are forced to accept such terms. 102 TFEU provides ‘a clear legal 
basis for enforcing FRAND.’74 Article 102 reads: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
                                                 
69 Ibid, pg. 1049-1050. 
70 See Philippe Chappatte n 58. Pg. 335-336. 
71 Craig Simpson. Standardizing technology. A further look at patent ambush and FRAND 
licensing undertakings. Competition Law Insight, 6 May 2008. Pg. 9. 
72 See Yann Meniere n 66. Pg.5, 16. 
73 See Philippe Chappatte n 58. Pg. 335-336. 
74 Ibid, pg.332. 
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(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, <…> have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
 
It is easy to notice that FRAND terms impose duties and/or prohibits actions 
similar to those set by article 102 TFEU. EU Commission, by no doubt, has 
most experience in enforcing article 102 TFEU and providing legal and 
economic expertise on what is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory in a 
number of different categories, including licensing of IPRs. The Commission 
has competence worldwide to require third parties to provide confidential 
information of their IPR licensing activities. Therefore, it is best placed to 
assess whether conduct was fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.75 
 
Some authors propose ex ante price negotiations, provided by policies of 
SSOs, as a solution to minimize ex post overcharge of royalties.76 To comply 
with a standard, especially in ICT, companies put at stake millions of euros 
as investments, that, as addressed before, could be captured by ‘bad’ SEP 
owners. Naturally, companies want to count their legitimate expectations and 
know in advance the price that comes from compliance with a standard. Such 
ex ante policy of SSOs certainly would ease the risks of patent hold-up at 
some degree.77 However, critics of ex ante pricing raise stronger counter 
arguments. First, it was discussed above with reference to Douglas Lichtman, 
that standard-setting process, especially in relation to ICT standards, from 
technical perspective is as difficult as it gets. Therefore, loosely defined 
FRAND and ex post negotiations unburdens participants from dealing with 
legal matters and allows to concentrate on what is most important: quality of 
a standard. Second, meetings between competitors in the context of 
standardization raises suspicions from competition authorities. The 
Commission, in decision against Rambus, stated that the process of standard-
setting amounts to collective decision-making with a risk of anticompetitive 
outcome, such as collusive price fixing.78 The line between collective price-
fixing and ex ante term negotiations appears to be too thin, that SSOs, at least 
in Europe, would venture to adopt such rules in a near future. This emerges 
from the fact that EU Commission closely cooperates with European SSOs, 
such as ETSI which explicitly warns its participants against disclosing 
licensing terms within ETSI:79  
 
‘Specific licensing terms and negotiations are commercial issues between the 
companies and shall not be addressed within ETSI. Technical Bodies are not the 
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77 See Jorge L. Contreras n 76. Pg. 168. 
78 See Rambus n 42. 
79 See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights. 19 September 2013. Section 4.1 Licensing 
terms and ex ante disclosure. 
 22 
appropriate place to discuss IPR Issues. Technical Bodies do not have the 
competence to deal with commercial issues. Members attending ETSI Technical 
Bodies are often technical experts who do not have legal or business responsibilities 
with regard to licensing issues. Discussion on licensing issues among competitors in 
a standards making process can significantly complicate, delay or derail this 
process.’ 
 
FRAND was designed to solve patent hold-up issues, generated by specifics 
of standard-setting. Intellectual property rights and ex ante investments by 
potential licensees confer a significant market power on SEP holders to 
extract profits at the expense of reduced competition and consumer welfare. 
Refusal to license, desirable royalties, right to injunctive reliefs are normally 
considered patentee’s justifiable interests that protect the incentives to 
innovate. However, inclusion into a standard increases patent’s value simply 
because third parties contributed significant investments to comply with a 
standard. The rationale of patents is that they ‘reward invention, not 
commercialisation.’80 Therefore, in the context of standard-setting, SEP 
holders should not be allowed to abuse these rights to extract higher rewards 
than the true value of their inventions. Present litigations, confusion of courts 
and discussions in legal community indicate that the concept of FRAND does 
weakly serve its purpose. The most widespread controversy is, whether 
FRAND commitments prohibit SEP holders from seeking injunctive reliefs 
against willing licensees. Neither rules of SSOs, neither competition 
authorities and short jurisprudence of European courts provide the clear 
answer. SEP owners right to injunction is subject to many considerations, 
which will be addressed below together with the recent judgment delivered 
by European Court of Justice in the case Huawei Technologies v ZTE.81 The 
beginning of Chapter 3 will provide analysis of legal treatment prior Huawei 
judgement. Second part will discuss the case in depth and will try to answer 
whether Huawei delivers a long-awaited precedent towards clarifying 
FRAND in relation to patent injunctions. 
 
 
                                                 
80 See S. Bostyn, N. Petit. Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction n 64. Pg. 2. 
81 Huawei Technologies v ZTE, C-170/13, EU:C:2015:477 
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3. Case discussion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Patent owner’s right to seek injunction against alleged patent infringer is 
among essential rights, granted by Intellectual Property Law, which guards 
patentee’s exclusive rights and incentives to innovate.82 IPR protection is also 
recognised as fundamental principle by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
European Union.83 To ensure the full respect of Intellectual Property, 
Directive 2004/48/EC84 provides remedies for effective IPR enforcement in 
Member States. Paragraph 1. of Article 9 of that directive, states that:  
 
‘Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the 
applicant: 
(a) issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual property right…’ 
 
Therefore, patent injunctions are granted by national courts under national IP 
rules, with no distinction between European and national patents. 
Nevertheless, recital 12 in the preamble of the Directive confirms that 
protection of IPR’s is not absolute and may be limited for the purposes of 
competition law: 
 
‘(12) This Directive should not affect the application of the rules of competition, and 
in particular Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. The measures provided for in this 
Directive should not be used to restrict competition unduly in a manner contrary to 
the Treaty.’ 
 
Seeking injunctions against patent infringers is the fundamentally 
acknowledged right. However, in the proceedings for injunctions against SEP 
infringements, defendants raise claims that seeking for injunction by SEP 
owner amounts to abuse of a dominant position under article 102 TFEU. 
While there is no clear precedent whether seeking for patent injunction 
amounts to abuse under article 102 TFEU, the Commission takes the view 
that seeking for injunctive reliefs of SEPs may result into anticompetitive 
effects ultimately harming the consumers. Additionally, national courts in 
Member states were hesitant to grant injunctions on a mere finding that there 
was an infringement of FRAND encumbered SEPs. However, in Germany, 
national courts inconsistently dealt with this type of cases and some been 
                                                 
82 TRIPS agreement articles 41,44. 
83 Article 17 (2). Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02. 
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84 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
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granting injunctions against licensees that were willing to accept FRAND 
terms and made appropriate offers. This led to confusion among courts in 
other Member States, where SEP holders were referring to the decisions of 
German courts in order to be granted patent injunction. Therefore, in Huawei 
v ZTE the German court decided to stay proceedings and refer to the CJEU 
for clarification. 
 
3.2 Huawei Technologies v ZTE     
                              
In 2009, Huawei technologies, operator in telecommunications sector, 
notified ETSI that it was holding a European patent (under reference EP 2 
090 050 b 1),85 essential to the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard, and 
committed to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND terms. Anyone willing 
to implement LTE standard had to use the teachings of Huawei’s patent. In 
2010, ZTE Corp. which is another operator in telecommunications sector, 
engaged into discussions with Huawei, concerning FRAND licensing in 
relation to ZTE’s products which were linked to LTE standard and 
manufactured without paying royalties to Huawei in respect of past acts of 
use. Huawei indicated the amount of royalties which it considered to be 
reasonable. ZTE Corp. was itself a holder of patents essential to LTE standard 
and sought cross-licensing as a better solution. However, the negotiations 
broke down and no licensing agreement was concluded. In 2011 Huawei 
Technologies brought an action against ZTE for patent infringement before 
the Landgericht Dusseldorf in Germany, seeking to obtain a prohibitory 
injunction, the rendering of accounts, the recall of products and award of 
damages. In its defence, ZTE claimed that it was willing to conclude the 
license on FRAND terms and the action, brought by Huawei Technologies 
for the injunction prohibiting the infringement, amounts to an abuse of a 
dominant position. The German court asked the European Court of Justice the 
following questions: 
 
(1)  Does the proprietor of an SEP, which informs a standardization body 
that is willing to grant any third party a licence on FRAND terms, 
abuse its dominant market position if it brings an action for an 
injunction against a patent infringer even though the infringer has 
declared that it is willing to negotiate concerning such licence? 
(2) If abuse of a dominant market position is already to be presumed as a 
consequence of the infringer’s willingness to negotiate: does article 
102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirements in 
relation to willingness to negotiate? In particular, can willingness to 
negotiate be presumed where the patent infringer has merely stated 
(orally) in a general way that it is prepared to enter into negotiations, 
or must the infringer already have entered into negotiations by, for 
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example, submitting specific conditions upon which it is prepared to 
conclude a licensing agreement? 
(3) If the submission of an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a 
licensing agreement is a prerequisite for abuse of a dominant position: 
does article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time 
requirements in relation to that offer? Must the offer contain all the 
provisions which are normally included in licensing agreements in the 
field of technology in question? In particular, may the offer be made 
subject to the condition that the SEP is actually used and/or is shown 
to be valid? 
(4) If the fulfilment of the infringer’s obligations arising from the licence 
that is to be granted is a prerequisite for the abuse of a dominant 
market position: does article 102 TFEU lay down particular 
requirements with regard to those acts of fulfilment? Is the infringer 
particularly required to render an account for past acts of use and/or 
to pay royalties? May an obligation to pay royalties be discharged, if 
necessary, by depositing a security? 
(5) Do the conditions, under which the abuse of a dominant position by 
the proprietor of a SEP is to be presumed, apply also to an action on 
the ground of other claims (for rendering of accounts, recall of 
products, damages) arising from a patent infringement?86 
 
In short, the referring court asked the CJEU to determine when SEP owner’s 
actions for patent injunction infringe article 102 TFEU. However, before the 
analysis of the Court’s answer takes place, it is important to take a look at the 
previous case law on assessment of the abuse of dominant position in relation 
to the exercise of IPRs. 
 
3.3  Dominant position 
 
Article 102 TFEU is applicable only in those situations where company holds 
a dominant position in the market. Dominant position is ‘a position of 
economic strength held by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market by giving 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers.’87 The ownership of 
IPRs, including SEPs, does not constitute dominance per se. However, 
possession of IPRs can confer dominant position to their owner, if holding 
IPRs enables company to prevent effective competition on the market.88 
Establishment of dominance relies on the examination of all the relevant 
circumstances specific to the case. In Motorola the Commission addressed 
that combination of large market shares and existence of barriers for 
                                                 
86 See Huawei Technologies v ZTE, paragraph 39. 
87 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission, 27/76, 
EU:C:1978:22. Paras. 65,66. 
88 Astra Zeneca v Commission, C-457/10P, EU:C:2012:770, para. 186. 
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competitors to enter or expand in the relevant market determines whether SEP 
owner enjoys dominant position.89  It follows, from the further considerations 
in Motorola Mobility, that SEP owner holds dominant position whereas:90 
 
1. It is indispensable for the companies to get access to the standard in 
order to remain or enter the relevant market; 
2. Market lock-in. Access to standard is necessary for the licensee’s 
products to interoperate within uniform network with products and 
services provided by other standard implementers. Also whereas, 
switching to alternative technology or standard is highly doubtful in 
the absence of competitive substitute and the industry players made 
large investments into infrastructure of current standard-compliant 
products. 
 
These factors constitute barriers to entry and determine SEP owner’s 
dominant position. Special characteristics of ICT market lead to suggestion 
that, in most cases, SEP’s inclusion into ICT standard confers its owner a 
dominant position. For example, successful performance of ICT industry 
requires wide adoption of standards to achieve interoperability among 
products and services of different manufacturers. In addition, technical 
standards are usually very complex and requiring precise follow for final 
product to operate. One standard may read on hundreds of SEPs and non-
compliance with a single SEP would impede the implementation of a whole 
standard. Therefore, the Commission declined Motorola’s claims that its 
dominant position was restricted by Apple’s bargaining power, on the 
grounds that the presence of such power does not change the fact, that there 
are no substitutes for Motorola’s SEP and anyone willing to implement the 
standard must get license from Motorola.91 In the event, it is difficult for SEP 
owner to prove that it does not hold dominant position. Access to SEPs is 
always indispensable to comply with the standard. Moreover, supplying not 
only interoperable but also cutting-edge products is the critical factor for 
success of ICT businesses. It is common practice to make early investments 
into new standard infrastructure in order to stay in the game. Thus, adoption 
of a standard nearly always leads to industry lock-in. According to some 
scholars,92 presumption that owning SEPs equals holding dominant position 
is incorrect. Standards regularly face competition from other, whether 
existing or future, standards as well as non-standardized technologies, which, 
in innovation driven markets, are quickly adopted. Also, formal standard-
setting is a ‘repeated-game’, which constrains SEP owners to exercise market 
power with regard to one standardized technology, as SSO members would 
punish such behavior by avoiding to include that technology in subsequent 
standard-setting. Furthermore, SEP holders face the need to obtain access to 
the same or another standard from other SEP proprietors, thus ‘one cannot be 
dominant and ‘dominated at the same time within one and the same business 
                                                 
89 COMMISSION DECISION of 29.04.2014. Case AT.39985 - Motorola - Enforcement of 
GPRS standard essential patents. Recitals (222)- (224). 
90 Ibid, recitals (227)- (236). 
91 Ibid, recitals (237)- (257).  
92 See M. Rato, N. Petit n 33. 
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relationship.’93 These arguments were put before the Commission by 
Motorola. Motorola claimed that Apple holds a large patent portfolio of SEPs 
and non-SEPs which makes it indispensable trading partner as it is impossible 
to avoid patent portfolio of that size.94 The Commission noted that it assessed 
whether Motorola, as a SEP holder, enjoys dominant position on a market as 
a whole and not on the basis of its negotiating position vis-à-vis one or more 
customers, such as Apple. Even if Motorola needs to obtain access to other 
SEPs or non-SEPs of other potential licensees, the fact remains that there are 
no substitutes for Motorola’s Cudak GPRS SEP and potential licensees 
cannot switch to another supplier. Were Motorola to accept lower royalty 
rates in exchange for obtaining access to other patents, it only means 
obtaining remuneration it desires, though it is not in a form of cash royalties. 
Therefore, there is no effect on Motorola’s ability to act to an appreciable 
extent independently of one or more potential licensees that hold patents 
indispensable for Motorola.95 Even, if one or few potential licensees could 
countervail Motorola’s negotiating power, due to their SEPs and non-SEPs, 
this would ensure that only particular customers are safe from the market 
power of Motorola. That would lead the existence of dominant position being 
dependent on the bargaining position of each potential licensee, relating to 
whether Motorola wants the access to its patents or not.96 The Commission 
also doubted whether standard-setting as a ‘repeat-game’ could constrain 
Motorola’s behavior, since Motorola did not provide any specific evidence. 
Shall Motorola experience any repercussions, it will depend on its market 
position and that of other participants in subsequent round of standard-
setting.97 Perhaps, counter arguments provided by the Commission to 
Motorola, led the referring court to presume existence of a dominant position 
in Huawei. Advocate General criticized the referring court, for not showing 
whether and how it found Huawei to hold dominant position. He pointed out 
that such findings should be based not on hypotheses but circumstances 
specific to the case, since constituting a dominance imposes special 
responsibility on the undertaking concerned. If holding SEPs, that potential 
licensees necessarily need to get access to, give rise to such presumption, it 
must be possible to rebut it with specific detailed evidence. However, under 
article 267 TFEU, the European Court of Justice is not entitled to change 
substance of referred questions and shall only give rulings on the 
interpretation or the validity of a provision of EU law on the basis of the facts 
put before it by the national court.98 Therefore, the assessment given by the 
Commission remains the only source indicating whether SEP holders enjoy 
dominant position, which does not mean that CJEU will provide the same 
outcome if such matter is raised before it.  
                                                 
93 Ibid, pg. 15 -16. 
94 Motorola decision n 89, recital (238). 
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96 Ibid, recitals (244), (245), (246). 
97 Ibid, recitals (263), (264). 
98 Opinion of Advocate General delivered on 20 November 2014 in Case C‑170/13 Huawei 
Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp, ZTE Deutschland GmbH. Points 53-58. 
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3.4 Abusive conduct 
 
The CJEU stated, that in order to provide the answer and assess the lawfulness 
of seeking injunction against the SEP infringer with which no licensing 
agreement has been concluded, it must strike the balance between 
maintaining free competition and the requirement to safeguard SEP holder’s 
rights guaranteed by IP law and the Charter.99 Fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Charter are not absolute and may be subject to limitations under Article 
52 (1), provided that those limitations respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms and  are imposed in order  to meet the objectives recognised by the 
Union or for the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and meet 
the principle of proportionality. The objective of promoting free competition 
and internal market is enshrined in the Article 3 TEU. Therefore, limitations 
on fundamental rights can be imposed for the purposes of EU competition 
law, in this case, article 102 TFEU. The right to access courts as possible 
breach of article 102 TFEU was addressed in the case ITT Promedia NV v 
Commission100, it was observed that: 
 
‘The ability to assert one's rights through the courts and the judicial control which 
that entails constitute the expression of a general principle of law which underlies 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States <…> As access to the 
Court is a fundamental right and a general principle ensuring the rule of law, it is 
only in wholly exceptional circumstances that the fact that legal proceedings are 
brought is capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant position…’101 
 
The exception to the general rule, that accessing the court is not the abuse of 
dominant position, applies whereas: an undertaking brings actions before the 
court, not as an attempt to establish its rights, but as a mean to harass the 
opposite party and an overall goal of these actions is to eliminate 
competition.102 These conditions must be ‘construed and applied strictly, in a 
manner which does not defeat the application of the general rule.’103 The 
CJEU also pointed out that undertakings in a dominant position may be 
deprived of the right to adopt a course of conduct or take measures which are 
not in themselves abuses and which are permitted for the non-dominant 
firms.104 According to settled case-law, the concept of abuse of a dominant 
position is an objective concept and refers to the conduct of a dominant 
undertaking which is such as to influence the structure of a market where the 
degree of competition is already weakened precisely because of the presence 
of the undertaking concerned, and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those governing normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
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market or the growth of that competition.105 Therefore, dominant firm’s 
behaviour, whether normal business practice or assertion of its statutory 
rights, may produce anticompetitive effects which do not arise from the 
conduct of non-dominant companies. The list of abusive practices under 
article 102 TFEU is not exhaustive. Indeed, it can be anything that causes 
direct damage to consumers or those practices which are detrimental to 
consumers through their impact on competition.106 Legitimate exercise of 
IPRs is not an exception:  
 
‘The illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU is unrelated to its 
compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules and, in the majority of cases, 
abuses of dominant positions consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under 
branches of law other than competition law.’107 
 
The European Court of Justice in Michelin ruled out that holding dominant 
position in itself is not the infringement of article 102 TFEU, but the 
undertaking in such position has ‘a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common 
market.’108 The actual scope of dominant undertaking’s special responsibility 
must be considered in the light of specific circumstances to that case, which 
show that competition has been weakened.109 In Magill case, which involved 
refusal to license and obtaining injunctions against copyright infringements, 
the CJEU held that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor does 
not constitute an abuse of dominant position per se, but present exceptional 
circumstances, seeking for protection and enforcement of IPRs may involve 
abusive conduct.110 The Court provided that exceptional circumstances in the 
case were: refusal to supply prevented the appearance of a new product for 
which there was a consumer demand; the proprietors were reserving 
themselves the secondary market by excluding all competition on the market; 
and there was no justification for such refusal.111 Consequently, in IMS 
Health, the CJEU noted that refusing to give access to a product or service 
which is indispensable for carrying on a particular business will be treated as 
abusive if it does meet three cumulative conditions set in Magill.112 It was 
also observed that anticompetitive effects, generated by refusal to license, 
have to be seen on secondary market:113 
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‘As the Advocate General stated in point 62 of his Opinion, that condition relates to 
consideration that, balancing of the interest in protection of copyright and the 
economic freedom of its owner, against the interest in protection of free competition 
the latter can prevail only where refusal to grant a license prevents the development 
of the secondary market to the detriment of consumers.’ 
 
It follows, that competition interests will override IPR holders’ rights only 
when refusal to grant access to those IPRs prevents development of secondary 
(upstream or downstream) market to the decreased consumer welfare.114 It is 
feared that competition law intervention into IPRs would decrease inventors’ 
incentives to innovate and set the condition for competitors to free-ride on 
IPR holders’ inventions. This argument was put before the CJEU by 
Microsoft.115 The Commission found that Microsoft refused to supply full 
interoperability information, protected under copyright, to producers of 
servers. It was concluded that Microsoft’s conduct met the exceptional 
circumstances set in Magill and IMS Health, therefore was abusive.116 
Microsoft argued that protection of its incentives to innovate provides the 
objective justification for such conduct.117 Furthermore, it claimed that 
competitors would be discouraged from taking the trouble to create their own 
technology and just rather wait to see what technology they can obtain under 
a license.118 The Court and the Commission dismissed these arguments on 
numerous grounds. First, the Community legislature considers that the 
disclosure of interoperability information benefits the innovation, especially 
in the software sector.119 In normal competitive circumstances software 
developers have every incentive to favour interoperability between their 
products and their competitors’ products, through disclosure of 
interoperability information, as consumers place great significance on 
interoperable products.120 Microsoft’s refusal to disclose information 
precludes the competitors to take advantage from their own innovation by the 
lack of interoperability, thus impairing genuine technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers. The Commission claims that refusal to license 
impairs ‘consumer’s ability to benefit from such innovation, as well as the 
competitors’ ability to earn in return on their innovation-and hence in the 
longer term their incentives to innovate.’121 Therefore, Microsoft’s 
arguments, that order to license such information would reduce competitors’ 
incentives to invest in their own innovation and instead copy Microsoft’s 
intellectual property, was ungrounded. The Commission noted that 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate are not relevant to the assessment of the 
consequences which the abusive practice has for its competitors’ incentive to 
innovate.122 ‘All things considered, the positive impact on the level of 
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innovation in the whole industry outweighed the negative impact of the 
dominant undertaking’s incentives to innovate.’123 Furthermore, Microsoft 
failed demonstrate in which way information disclosure would reduce its own 
incentives to innovate, since previously it did supply such information to 
producers of servers, but cut it back when it entered the market itself.124  
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4. Huawei v ZTE: ‘The Middle 
Path’ 
 
4.1 Samsung/Motorola and Orange-Book-Standard 
 
The Commission in Microsoft expanded the criteria laid down in Magill/IMS 
Health. Although, the refusal to license did not prevent entry of new products 
to the market, it did limit the technical development or ‘follow-on’ innovation 
of new products, which, according to the Commission, has the same outcome- 
decreased welfare of consumers.125 Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft, 
concerned refusal to license copyrights, however the wording by the Court 
did not seem to limit its judicial treatment in the field of copyrights.126 Indeed, 
the Commission included Magill/IMS Health criteria in its Guidance, which 
provides that the Commission will consider refusal to license IPRs as abusive 
where the three circumstances are present: the refusal relates to a product or 
service for effective competition on a downstream market; the refusal is likely 
to eliminate effective competition on the downstream market; the refusal is 
likely to lead to consumer harm.127 Nevertheless, the list of exceptional 
circumstances is not exhaustive.128 In, 2014, the Commission adopted the 
decision concerning Samsung’s seeking of injunctions against Apple on the 
basis of its SEPs covering UMTS standard.129 The Commission held that 
exceptional circumstances were the UMTS standard-setting process and 
Samsung’s commitment to ETSI to license its SEPs on FRAND terms and 
conditions.130 The same conclusions were made in decision against Motorola 
in relation to GPRS standard.131 The Commission stressed the special role that 
standards play in European competitiveness. Standards provide 
interoperability and compatibility between related products which is highly 
beneficial for innovation and freedom of choice for consumers. In addition, 
standards contribute to the Treaty objectives of achieving integration between 
national markets. Therefore, European Union is highly interested in 
promotion of effective and widely adopted standards132 However, the 
Commission expressed concerns towards the power gained by SEP holders 
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due to their technology inclusion into a standard.133 Such power used in anti-
competitive ways may negatively affect competition, consumers and 
effectiveness of a standard. The nature of fast-moving markets pressure 
companies to adjust their products to newest technical trends and 
interoperability qualities in order to maintain successful competition. 
Accordingly, it is strategically important to start investments into standard-
compliant products as early as possible, which usually is before the formal 
adoption of standard. The commitments made by SEP owners to license their 
technologies on FRAND terms encourage such investments even to a higher 
degree.134 The Commission stresses out the serious tensions in industry, 
where sunk costs amount to hundreds of billions, due to potential patent hold-
up. Even temporary exclusion of products in fast-moving market can result in 
significant losses.135 The industry’s sensitivity to SEP owners’ will and terms 
to license lead to conclusion that the context of standard-setting process and 
FRAND commitments provide exceptional circumstances which limit SEP 
owners freedom to exercise its IPRs and impose special responsibility not to 
impair the access to standard by anyone willing to do so.136 However, it is 
necessary to strike a fair balance between public interest in free competition 
and the respect of SEP owners’ rights and freedoms, safeguarded by the 
Charter: protection of intellectual property (Article 17 (2)); access to tribunal 
(Article 47) and freedom to conduct business (Article 16). The Commission 
noted that it conducted balancing test in conformity with Article 52 (1) of the 
Charter.137 The Commission concluded that seeking injunctions against 
Apple by Samsung and Motorola amounts to abuse of dominant position, 
because SEP holders, when contributing their technology to standard, agreed 
to license their SEPs, and to license those SEPs on FRAND terms.138 The 
Commission noted that such conduct could be justified by licensee’s 
unwillingness to conclude license on FRAND terms.139 However, Apple was 
‘not unwilling’ to enter these licenses therefore such conduct cannot be 
justified. According to the Commission, Apple’s proposal to Motorola  to 
enter FRAND licensing with full judicial review and determination of 
proposed royalties by court, was enough to conclude that Apple was a ‘willing 
licensee’.140 The Commission’s definition of ‘willing licensee’ differed from 
the one applied by German courts under Orange-Book-Standard, which set 
stricter terms on willing licensees in favour of SEP holders.141 In Orange-
Book-Standard case the German Supreme Court stated that abuse of dominant 
position by seeking injunctions would occur only if the license seeker: 
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a) Makes an unconditional binding offer to conclude a license, that 
patent owner cannot reject without violating antitrust law.142 
b) Satisfying in advance the conditions of that license agreement. The 
licensee has to show its willingness to pay (into court deposit) and 
render accounts.143 
 
The potential licensees were obliged to take positive steps so they could rely 
on competition law defence against injunctions. ‘Unconditional’ offer means, 
that it should not be conditional on a court holding that alleged infringer’s 
behaviour did infringe the patent. Furthermore, infringer seeking to rely on 
competition law was required by German courts to waive its rights on 
challenging the validity of the patent.144 Apple did not fulfil these obligations 
set by Orange-Book-Standard and the German court granted an injunction 
against it. The Commission criticized the German courts for not paying 
attention that the original Orange Book judgement145 related to specifications 
that had become a de facto standard and not to specifications agreed by the 
SSOs. Moreover, owners of the patents regarding de facto standards did not 
commit to licensing on FRAND terms.146 The Commission also clarified that 
a willing licensee retained its right to challenge the validity of the patent, as 
it is of public interest to eliminate any obstacles to economic activity, which 
may arise where a patent is granted in error.147  
 
4.2 Huawei judgment 
 
Confusion between different approaches in Orange-Book-Standard and in 
Samsung/Motorola pressured the District Court of Dusseldorf to submit a 
request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU in Huawei case. The European 
Court of Justice chose to respond to request by answering altogether the first 
4 Questions and 5 Question in so far as that question concerns legal 
proceedings brought with a view to obtaining the recall of products. The 
Court repeated that:148 
 
‘exercise of an exclusive right linked to intellectual-property right – in the case in 
the main proceedings, namely the right to bring an action for infringement- forms 
part of the rights of the proprietor of an intellectual-property right, with the result 
that the exercise of such a right, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a 
dominant position, cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position <…>’ 
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However, the Court also relied on case-law, that in the presence of the 
exceptional circumstances, such exercise by the proprietor may involve 
abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU.149 Nevertheless, it 
pointed out that the particular circumstances in Huawei distinguish the case 
from Magill and IMS Health.150 Advocate General M. Wathelet in his 
Opinion noted that similarly to previous case-law, having a licence to use 
Huawei’s SEP is indispensable to the production of LTE standard-compliant 
products and services. Nevertheless, the contrast lies in Huawei’s voluntary 
commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms, which ‘cannot at first sight, 
be treated as a refusal akin to those envisaged in the case-law.’ Thus, the 
attention must be paid to the manner on which Huawei fulfilled its 
commitment.151 The Court affirmed, that indispensability of SEP at issue to 
all competitors that envisage manufacturing standard-compliant products, 
constitutes exceptional circumstance. Furthermore, patent at issue, obtained 
SEP status only in exchange for Huawei’s irrevocable commitment to ETSI, 
that it is prepared to grant licenses on FRAND terms. Those commitments 
created legitimate expectations on the part of third parties, that SEP owner 
will in fact grant licenses on such terms. Additionally, Huawei accepted that 
royalties fixed according to FRAND principles is the adequate compensation 
for the use of its patents.152  Advocate General was more thorough in 
addressing why indispensable use of SEPs and FRAND commitments 
constitute exceptional circumstances. First, he pointed out that ‘Huawei did 
not waive its right to bring actions for prohibitory injunctions against persons 
using the teaching protected by the patent at issue without its consent.’ 
Nevertheless, by undertaking the FRAND commitment, Huawei showed the 
willingness to exploit its SEP not only by using it exclusively but also through 
licensing it to the others and accepts FRAND fixed royalty as adequate for 
the use of that patent.153 It should be noted that ETSI is extremely cautious 
that all technologies, covered by patents, included into a standard are 
available through licensing. Non-availability of licenses leads ETSI to look 
for the alternative solutions. Huawei’s voluntary commitment of FRAND 
licensing given to ETSI, had an impact on the standardization procedure and 
the content of LTE standard itself.154 Therefore, FRAND commitment by 
Huawei led to the inclusion of its patent into LTE standard; such inclusion 
and gaining SEP status led to competitors’ technological dependence on 
Huawei; and that technological dependence leads to economic dependence- 
potential licensees legitimately expecting to obtain FRAND licenses start 
investments for the compliance with the standard. Therefore, following from 
these circumstances and that where infringer ‘has shown itself to be 
objectively ready, willing and able to conclude such a licensing agreement’, 
bringing an action for prohibitory injunction, which varies from the FRAND 
commitments, constitutes recourse to a method different from those, 
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governing normal competition. Such conduct ‘has an adverse effect on 
competition to the detriment, in particular, of consumers and the undertakings 
which have invested in the preparation, adoption and application of the 
standard; and it must be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position for the 
purposes of Article 102 TFEU.’155 The Court noted that Article 102 TFEU, 
however, imposes obligation on SEP owner only to grant a license on 
FRAND terms. Nevertheless, the Directive 2004/48, in accordance with the 
Charter, provides high level of protection for IPRs, and the substance of those 
rights must be respected, even if SEP owner previously gave FRAND 
commitments. The issue though arises, that parties to the case are in 
disagreement on what are FRAND terms. In order to balance out the interests 
of the parties, the Court provided a list of requirements that SEP owner must 
fulfil, when seeking for prohibitory injunctions or recall of products, in order 
for such conduct not to amount to abuse of dominant position under Article 
102 TFEU.156 Here is the list of steps for the proprietor and alleged infringer 
to follow:157 
 
1. SEP owner must first alert the alleged infringer by specifying the SEP 
and the way in which it has been infringed; 
2. If the infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a FRAND 
license, the SEP owner shall present a specific, written offer for a 
FRAND license, specifying the amount of the royalty and the way in 
which that royalty is calculated; 
3. The alleged infringer shall diligently and in good faith, in accordance 
with recognised commercial practices, respond to that offer by 
accepting it or submit to the proprietor, promptly and in writing, a 
specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms. 
4. If the proprietor rejects the counter-offer and the infringer is already 
using the teachings of the SEP, the infringer shall provide appropriate 
security, for example a bank guarantee or place the amounts necessary 
to deposit. The calculation of that security must include the number 
of past acts of use of the SEP and the alleged infringer must be able 
to render an account in respect of those acts. 
5. Additionally, when proprietor rejects the counter-offer, the parties 
may, by common agreement, request that the amount of royalty may 
be determined by an independent third party, by decision without 
delay. 
 
Only if SEP owner follows these obligations, it may bring proceedings for 
prohibitory injunction without breaching article 102 TFEU. Accordingly, the 
alleged infringer may not rely on abusive conduct by the SEP holder in the 
defence, if it didn’t follow these steps. Indeed, the Court took ‘the middle 
path’ between only-licensee obligations in the Orange-Book-Standard and 
‘not unwilling licensee’ interpretation by the Commission, as promised by 
Advocate General.158 The Court distributed duties on both parties to show 
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their willingness to conclude a FRAND license. The Court’s reasoning is that 
the infringer may sometimes be unaware that he’s using the teachings of 
proprietor’s SEP, especially where standard includes large number of 
SEPs.159 Furthermore, if, after the alert, the licensee expresses its will to 
conclude FRAND license, the owner of SEP shall make a first offer as he is 
best placed to know whether that offer complies with non-discrimination 
requirement, especially if he already concluded licensing agreements with 
other competitors.160 Also, where the SEP holder has given commitments to 
license on FRAND terms, he is expected to make such an offer. On its part, 
the infringer should either accept or submit counter-offer, and, if that counter-
offer is rejected by the proprietor, to provide appropriate security for its past 
acts of use. Additionally, the CJEU concluded that patent infringer retains the 
right to challenge the validity or essentiality of the SEPs during the 
negotiations and in the future, due to rights of effective judicial protection, 
guaranteed by the Charter.161 In regard to the second part of fifth Question, 
the CJEU stated that actions for infringement brought by the SEP proprietor 
seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use, do not have 
a direct impact on the products complying with the standard in question 
manufactured by competitors appearing or remaining in the market. 
Therefore, the list of requirements does not apply for seeking the rendering 
of accounts and cannot be regarded as an abuse of dominant position under 
Article 102 TFEU.162 
 
 
4.2 Implications of Huawei requirements 
 
Standardization, FRAND and IPRs gave much room for speculations and 
disputes in the legal community. Ongoing patent wars between companies, 
mainly in mobile telephony sector, using their patents to exclude competitors 
and inconsistent dealing with patent injunctions throughout the Union courts 
reached the critical point for demand of antitrust intervention provided by the 
highest Union’s court. Huawei gave that opportunity for the CJEU to step 
forward and provide long awaited clarification. However, it seems that 
Huawei’s incomprehensive ruling gave little answers and raised more 
questions around FRAND licensing and seeking for injunctions. The 
discussion follows on most common questions throughout legal community 
triggered by Huawei. First, existence of dominant position preconditions 
application of Article 102 TFEU. Unfortunately, the Court was not entitled to 
provide such analysis. AG, nevertheless warned that the fact that undertaking 
owns a SEP does not necessarily mean that it holds dominant position, and it 
is for the national court to determine on case-by-case basis if that is indeed 
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the situation.163 The analysis provided by the Commission remains the only 
reliable source indicating when SEP holder enjoys dominant position. In fact, 
according to Samsung/Motorola, most of the SEP owners, even where 
relevant standard consists of hundreds of SEPs of different proprietors, will 
enjoy dominance unless there are substitutable standards. Second, the 
criticism focuses on the manner in which the Court addressed the case. The 
referring court asked when the SEP holder, seeking injunctions, is incurring 
antitrust liability. Instead the CJEU provided conditions when there is no 
antitrust liability.164 Thus, implication may be that Huawei leaves out more 
injunction cases that may be subject to Article 102 TFEU than it should. 
Third, the Court did not define FRAND or guide to FRAND pricing. As stated 
before loose FRAND leads to many situations causing disputes: hold-up 
situations where SEP owner will demand excessive royalties; or hold-out 
where implementer will make counter-offers of too low royalties. However, 
what if both parties offer royalties contrary to FRAND terms? Is the 
proprietor abusing its dominant position for seeking injunction, because he 
was the first to make an offer and thus first to breach the requirement to 
identify FRAND royalties? In contrast, there may be situations where both 
SEP proprietor and infringer set royalties that satisfy FRAND terms, but are 
different in respect of each other. The Court in the list of requirements states 
that if the counter-offer is rejected, the amount of royalties may be determined 
by the third party. However, the condition is that both parties reach a common 
agreement to seek for third party’s help, therefore it is not a requirement but 
rather a proposal. The Court, however, provides no answer what happens 
when parties disagree to third party’s determination.165 On the other hand, it 
is unclear whether this is an issue at all. SEP owner and standard implementer 
are best suited to know the business practice in relevant sector and the value 
of the SEP in question. It is thus for proprietor and licensee to express 
FRAND in numbers. Shall they fail to conclude such an agreement then the 
parties can place their bets on ‘the wisdom of national courts’.166 The next 
concern focuses around proprietors’ incentives. According to this argument, 
the Huawei exceptional circumstances doctrine may discourage patent 
owners to participate in formal standard-setting in SSOs and instead obtain 
de facto SEP, without undertaking FRAND commitments.167  This is quite 
opposite to N. Petit concerns, that Huawei extends antitrust liability only to a 
small line of injunction cases.168 It was seen before, that not only public or 
competition authorities consider standard-setting as highly beneficial, but 
also the companies themselves. The incorporation of IPRs disclosure and 
FRAND commitments into policies of SSOs didn’t seem to reduce incentives 
of companies to participate. Furthermore, incentives of the whole industry 
outweigh that of separate firms. Wouldn’t a more lenient approach towards 
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SEP proprietors reduce whole industry’s incentives to implement standards 
in the future? Nevertheless, the question remains on antitrust treatment of de 
facto SEPs, along the one where injunctions are sought not by a competitor 
but an upstream company that does not implement standards itself. Therefore, 
Huawei does leave many questions open, and some of them may not be for 
competition law to answer. For now, it should be welcomed that the CJEU 
tries to bring bona fide commercial discussions between parties to actually 
conclude a FRAND licence instead of battling with injunctions and abusive 
conduct claims. It is certain that Huawei will not allow SEP owners to use 
injunctions aiming to exclude their rivals and limit free competition, nor it 
will safeguard the standard implementers free-riding on SEPs without 
intention to obtain a licence or unable to pay royalties. Perhaps, it was the 
Court’s goal to clear out standard-setting from these extremities first, with a 
view to provide further clarification in subsequent disputes. 
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5. Conclusion 
SEP holder retains the essence of its right to seek for patent injunctions 
against alleged infringers.  However, holding SEPs and commitments to 
FRAND licensing constitute exceptional circumstances under which SEP 
proprietor may be liable for seeking prohibitory injunctions under Article 102 
TFEU. Existence of dominant position preconditions application of Article 
102 TFEU, it is, therefore, important that SEP proprietor indeed enjoys 
dominant position, which is only found on case-by-case basis on the facts 
relevant to the case. SEP holder, who enjoys dominant position and 
committed to FRAND licensing, must follow the requirements imposed by 
the CJEU in Huawei in order not to be held liable for seeking injunctions as 
abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. Huawei requirements 
also regard potential licensee, who must show its willingness to conclude 
FRAND license. Only when alleged infringer fulfilled those obligations, it 
then can rely on competition law defence that SEP proprietor is abusing its 
dominant position in patent injunction cases.  
 
It was seen that the Court is still unwilling to give more weight to the concept 
of FRAND. Defining explicit FRAND meaning in terms of royalty rates may 
provide some legal certainty for companies and lawyers. Nevertheless, legal 
precedent setting royalties may cause more harm than good. First, it is 
difficult to balance a fixed royalty rates for all companies with different 
business models participating in standard setting. Upstream companies are 
sole inventors, where their main revenue comes from licensing, and usually 
they desire higher royalty rates. Vertically integrated companies, on the other 
hand, can afford to accept lower royalties. Thus, explicit FRAND may 
discourage some innovators to participate in formal standard-setting and/or 
grant higher rewards than it is contributed to developing a technology. 
Therefore, competition authorities are still hesitant to intervene into 
commercial freedom of private parties to agree on prices themselves. 
FRAND, on the other hand, is not perfect. The Commission stresses out the 
problem of costly IPRs as one of the obstacles for EU’s performance in 
innovation. This may be because current FRAND does not effectively prevent 
companies from setting high royalties. 
 
In author’s view, Huawei took the first step towards better standard-setting 
and competition in ICT market. Costly and long litigations do no good. Some 
may argue, whether Huawei does effectively impose antitrust liability for 
premature seeking for patent injunctions. For example, the Commission did 
not impose fines on Samsung and Motorola mainly because there were no 
relevant case-law covering this matter. But now there is, and maybe the risk 
of getting fines for trying to exclude the competitors will discourage 
companies from battling each other and settle for FRAND agreements 
instead. 
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